








A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox: 







As the recent and current French military interventions in West Africa have illustrated, 
France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies 
during the transfer of power. In Britain’s case, by contrast, decolonisation was largely 
followed by military withdrawal. This was not, however, for lack of trying. The episode of 
the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement clearly illustrates that Britain, driven by its global 
Cold War military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The agreement was first welcomed by the Nigerian elite, which was not only anglophile and 
anti-communist, but also wanted British military assistance for the build-up of its armed 
forces. Yet in Nigeria, the defence pact was faced with mounting opposition, and decried as a 
neo-colonial scheme. Whereas this first allowed the Nigerian leaders to extract strategic, 
material and financial concessions from Britain, it eventually led to the abrogation of the 
agreement. Paradoxically, Britain’s Cold War grand strategy created not only the need for the 
agreement, but also to abrogate it. In the increasingly global East-West struggle, the 
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A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox: 
The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement, 1958-1962 
 
Since decolonization, France has repeatedly intervened militarily in its former Sub-Saharan 
African colonies, most recently in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Central African Republic. 
These interventions have been facilitated, if not rendered possible, by France’s pre-positioned 
forces and military bases on the continent, and close defence ties with mostly francophone 
African countries. Both the bases and the defence relationships date back to the 
decolonisation period. During the transfer of power, France was able to establish lasting 
security relationships through defence and military assistance agreements with most of its 
Sub-Saharan African colonies.1 In the case of the British, and in stark contrast to their long-
time imperial rival, African independence was soon followed by formal military withdrawal. 
Instead, with the temporary exception of Kenya,2 Britain increasingly relied on informal and 
often shaky defence relationships with its former African colonies, if at all they looked to 
London for their military needs. Admittedly, the British did not attach as much strategic 
importance to their post-colonial role in Africa as the French did, and thus pursued more 
moderate and cost-effective military aims. Nevertheless, Britain had specific and important 
strategic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, which it tried to secure through the establishment of 
formal defence relationships.3 The episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement 
illustrates particularly well this, as well as the delicate bargaining between the (former) 
imperial power and the emerging or newly independent African state against the background 
of the Cold War. 
During the negotiations in the run up to independence, the British secured from the 
Nigerian elites the commitment that as an independent country Nigeria would enter into a 
defence agreement with Britain. While the British desired to protect their strategic interests in 
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West Africa, the largely anglophile Nigerian leaders believed that a defence relationship with 
Britain would be beneficial for their country’s security and the development of their armed 
forces. The Nigerians stood by their promise, and a few months after achieving independence 
in October 1960, the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement was signed. The latter became, 
however, increasingly unpopular in Nigeria. In light of the strong and mounting opposition, 
the Nigerian and British governments decided to abrogate the defence agreement in January 
1962 – only roughly a year after its entry into force. The short-lived formalised postcolonial 
defence relationship between Britain and Nigeria has so far only received relatively limited 
attention. The works that focus extensively on the defence agreement were written before 
archival sources became available,4 and those on postcolonial defence and foreign policy, as 
well as on decolonisation, deal only marginally with this episode of Anglo-Nigerian defence 
relations.5 A notable exception is Hakeem Ibikunle Tijani, who discusses the defence 
agreement with the help of archival sources. Yet with a focus on Britain and Nigerian leftist 
nationalists, the analysis remains brief and does not sufficiently explore the strategic and 
political issues and reasons that led to the idea, drafting, signature and, finally, abrogation of 
the defence agreement.6 
The intricacies of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement throw up a number of 
intriguing questions, which a closer analysis allows to answer. The Nigerian opposition 
decried the defence agreement as a neo-colonial scheme that was an obstacle to full 
independence. As the continuous French security role in Africa referred to above illustrates, 
and as Martin Thomas has argued, decolonisation did not always result in fully-fledged 
independence. In numerous cases, it represented the transition from formal imperial rule to 
informal influence or control.7 Was the defence agreement thus part of a British neo-colonial 
design in Nigeria? The main argument of this article is that this was not the case. Like in the 
case of decolonisation itself,8 the determinant, albeit not the only factor for both the creation 
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and the abrogation of the defence agreement was the Cold War. Paradoxically, Britain’s 
global Cold War grand strategy created the need not only to enter into a defence agreement 
with Nigeria, but also to abrogate it. 
In the East-West struggle, the agreement was strategically desirable, but politically 
counterproductive. British military planners wanted to secure defence facilities in Nigeria to 
sustain and reinforce Britain’s capabilities and capacity to wage limited hot wars and, to a 
lesser extent, global war. In the latter scenario, the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, was 
obviously the only potential enemy. But also the former scenario was driven by a Cold War 
approach. Limited interventions were and could be considered necessary if a colony or a 
friendly country seemed to be exposed to communist incursions, or when an ‘orderly’ transfer 
of power was threatened, and this could ultimately benefit the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, 
however, a formalised defence relationship with a former African colony could be considered 
a neo-imperial scheme, strengthen the opposition in Nigeria, and thereby play into communist 
hands. This clearly ran contrary to London’s aim to gain the allegiance, or at least maintain a 
friendly attitude, of newly independent states. Both the military and the political approach 
were thus permeated by the Cold War. This was inevitable, because by the late 1950s, the 
Cold War had also arrived in Africa9 and, as a consequence, British policymakers shifted to a 
post-imperial mind-set. The ‘legacy of empire’, as John Kent has argued, ‘would have to 
fulfil a cold war role’.10 Yet in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Cold War in Africa was – 
with the notable exception of the Congo – still predominantly political and ideological. As a 
result, and as will be argued in this article, politics trumped the military in the Nigerian case. 
This was not only due to the fact that the defence facilities were ultimately not 
considered essential and Britain’s global role was increasingly questioned, but also because 
the military benefits the defence agreement would entail were dwindling as a consequence of 
Nigerian bargaining and political pressure. This article will thus illustrate that in the Cold 
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War in Africa, the British were not the only actors, and the Nigerians were not merely passive 
recipients of policies decided in Whitehall. The decolonisation process was influenced by 
both the imperial power and the colonised.11 The Anglo-Nigerian Defence agreement was 
negotiated between British and Nigerian policymakers. Although it was first initiated by the 
British, it then received a strong Nigerian imprint, and was finally abrogated because of 
Nigerian political and popular opposition. It will thus transpire that not only British 
policymakers and the Nigerian elite, but also the Nigerian people played an influential role. 
While the British were fully engaged in the Cold War, many Nigerians wanted to remain 
aloof from the East-West struggle. Like so many others in the emerging Third World, they 
envisioned a future not only free from imperial rule, but also from Cold War alliances.12 
Consequently, the British had to adapt to the Nigerians if they wanted to retain their 
goodwill, which was deemed important in the Cold War. In order to show the determinant 
role of the East-West struggle in the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement, as well as the 
increasingly influential role of Nigerian actors, this article focuses first on the British but 
mutually agreed idea of a defence agreement during the final stage in the negotiations for 
independence; then on the reframing and drafting of the agreement following Nigerian 




By the late 1950s, decolonisation in West Africa became increasingly inevitable, and thus 
accepted by policymakers in Whitehall. The question was not anymore whether, but how and 
when exactly independence would be granted. Even though Nigeria was not considered ready 
for full independence, an accelerated transfer of power was seen as necessary to retain the 
Nigerians’ goodwill. But during this process, Britain wanted to secure its strategic 
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requirements in Nigeria through a defence agreement – not least because with the 
globalisation of the Cold War against the background of accelerated decolonization, West 
Africa had gained unprecedented strategic importance in Whitehall’s military planning. 
The experience of the Second World War had increased Africa’s strategic importance 
for manpower, resources, and bases. In light of the coming loss of India, the continent thus 
became temporarily prominent in British strategic thinking. Especially the Labour Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee argued in favour of a stronger reliance on Africa, rather than the 
Middle East. Yet Attlee had to give in to his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Chiefs 
of Staff, who preferred to base Britain’s great power role on Asia and the Middle East.13 
Africa thus rapidly returned to its status as a zone of secondary strategic importance. But in 
the wake of the Suez disaster in 1956, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, Sub-Saharan Africa 
suddenly moved into the focus of British military planners. Staging and overflying rights in 
the Middle East were increasingly limited and contested, and Britain would thus have to rely 
on alternative air routes to circumvent the barrier in the Middle East to deploy or reinforce 
troops in its colonial possessions or other theatres outside of Europe in the case of a threat or 
conflict. The most realistic and attractive alternative to connect the United Kingdom to Asia 
was through West Africa, i.e. Nigeria. Moreover, according to Defence Minister Duncan 
Sandys’ White Paper of 1957, air-staging facilities and overflying rights were particularly 
important to conduct expeditionary operations outside Europe to sustain Britain’s world role 
in the Cold War. Moreover, and as David French has recently argued, Sandys did not intend 
to reduce, but rather to maintain or even reinforce Britain’s world role through his reforms. 
While the 1957 White Paper shifted the focus of Britain’s defence policy towards nuclear 
deterrence and dramatically reduced the size of the armed forces, it also aimed to strengthen 
the capabilities and capacity to mount expeditionary operations. In light of the reduction of 
the number and size of overseas garrisons, troops were supposed to be flown into operational 
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theatres. This entailed that staging posts and overflying rights, notably in Nigeria, gained 
significantly in importance. Admittedly, it was not necessarily Africa as such which was 
strategically important in the eyes of British military planners. But the African continent was 
nevertheless supposed to play an important role in supporting Britain’s global defence 
posture. As a result, and in line with Attlee’s vision a decade earlier, British defence interests 
moved further south and henceforth stretched from West Africa to Southeast Asia.14 With 
independence looming in Nigeria, it thus became important to secure the strategic 
requirements for after independence. 
The government of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan came to accept by the late 
1950s that Nigerian independence had to be granted rather sooner than later. Rising 
nationalist sentiment in Nigeria, Ghana’s independence in 1957, and the imminent 
independence of French West Africa considerably weakened Britain’s position. In addition, it 
was feared that delaying independence would tarnish Britain’s international reputation, 
provoke unrest, undermine British and western influence and, ultimately, favour communist 
infiltration. In the amicable constitutional talks between 1957 and 1959, after the 
consolidation of regional self-government, the British gave in to the Nigerian demand to set a 
firm date for full independence in October 1960.15 It was within the framework of these talks 
that the British obtained the Nigerian commitment to a defence agreement. 
In response to Macmillan’s request for an imperial ‘profit and loss account’, the 
Officials’ Committee report of May 1957 emphasised the strategic importance of Nigeria. 
The main reason was Kano airport in Northern Nigeria, which was on the air communications 
line to Uganda, Kenya, the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East, and thus formed an important 
part of the trans-African air reinforcement route. ‘The loss of the present airfield facilities at 
Kano’, it was concluded, ‘would have a most serious effect on the ability to safeguard British 
interests in the Indian Ocean area’. In addition, the ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt were 
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considered ‘convenient’, yet ‘not essential’ in limited and global war.16 As a result, the 
Cabinet concluded the same month that it was important to retain such ‘strategic concessions’ 
as overflying rights and staging posts in the Nigerian independence process.17 The strategic 
requirements in the colonies that were likely to achieve independence in the foreseeable 
future were further refined by the Joint Planning Staff (JPS). In its report of late July 1957, it 
listed Nigeria alongside Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, Singapore, and East Africa as one of 
the strategically most important colonies for the UK’s sea, air, and wireless communications, 
network of bases, and military manpower sources. More specifically, the JPS recommended 
to add the following paragraph to the Colonial Office’s memorandum on ‘Future 
Constitutional Developments in the Colonies’, which was supposed to reflect and guide 
governmental decolonisation policy: 
 With the emergence of the potential air/sea barrier in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
the Central African air route for the reinforcement of territories south and east of 
Suez has assumed great importance. The airfield at Kano is an essential link in 
this chain. A minor requirement may be the use of the ports of Lagos and Port 
Harcourt in global war. The United Kingdom would therefore wish to retain 
unfettered overflying and staging rights and in global war the right to use Lagos 
and Port Harcourt.18 
In late August, Nigeria’s strategic importance was again highlighted by the JPS. In a report 
mandated by the Minister of Defence on how Britain could secure strategic facilities in 
territories that were likely to achieve independence, Nigeria figured among the ‘Essential or 
Potential Centres of Communication’.19 In line with the Defence White Paper, Nigeria was 
supposed to offer staging posts to reinforce small overseas garrisons, notably through a 
strategic reserve and an air transport force. Thereby, it was supposed to play its part in 
Britain’s defence strategy, which aimed ‘to win the cold war and prevent global war’ by 
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resisting and deterring aggression in cooperation with allied countries, notably through 
NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact; and defending British territories against local attack 
and conducting limited operations in overseas emergencies. Nigeria was thus not an end, but 
a means in Britain’s overall defence planning. Nevertheless, it was considered an important 
means, i.e. ‘an essential link’ in the ‘Central African air route for the reinforcement of 
territories south and east of Suez’. The relevant defence facilities in Nigeria had thus to be 
retained, preferably ‘by agreement and good will’.20 By early autumn, the revised 
memorandum on the ‘Future Constitutional Developments in the Colonies’ for the Cabinet 
Colonial Policy Committee had fully taken on board the view of the JPS. Moreover, 
alternatives to the Central African air-route via Kano, notably around Africa or across French 
West and Equatorial Africa, were considered undesirable.21 
With decolonisation gathering pace in Africa, the JPS and the Chiefs of Staff 
confirmed Nigeria’s strategic importance. In February 1958, in reviewing British defence 
requirements in West Africa in reaction to Ghanaian independence, the Chiefs of Staff 
approved a Joint Planning Staff report according to which the ‘emergence of the Middle East 
barrier’ had further increased the importance of the trans-African reinforcement route. With 
Kano airfield considered an ‘essential link’ of this air route, it was concluded that ‘the United 
Kingdom would […] wish to retain unfettered overflying and staging rights at all times’. In 
global war, Britain also required the use of the ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt. While the 
Chiefs of Staff considered it ‘politically impracticable’ to tie the granting of independence to 
the provision of defence facilities, they advised to secure the defence requirements in West 
Africa either through informal arrangements or formal agreements.22 Yet again, and as a JPS 
report of the same month made clear, British military planners did not have the defence of 
Nigeria, or Africa more generally, in mind. The continent was considered unlikely to be 
threatened in global war, and the strategy for the defence of Africa was based on the ‘nuclear 
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deterrent’, which offered ‘the only hope of preventing global war and thus obviating the need 
to defence [sic] the Middle East and Africa against armed aggression’.23 Nevertheless, 
defence facilities in Nigeria, Kano in particular, remained important means in Britain’s global 
defence scheme, especially since there were no straightforward alternatives available.24 
As a result, a defence agreement with Nigeria came increasingly to be seen as the best 
way forward to secure the United Kingdom’s (UK) strategic interests.25 It was questionable, 
however, whether an agreement would provide truly unrestricted access to Kano airfield. The 
Governor-General of Nigeria doubted that Kano could be used for war with a Muslim country 
in the Middle East.26 In searching for alternatives to Kano, the Ministry of Defence thus came 
up with the idea of an enclave in Nigeria, which would remain under British sovereignty after 
independence.27 Yet both the idea of unfettered staging and overflying rights and the 
suggestion of an enclave were sceptically received by the Colonial Office and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office. It was feared that by pushing the Nigerian leaders into 
accepting such ‘traces of Colonialism’, the future of Anglo-Nigerian relations, which rested 
on goodwill, would be jeopardised.28 The idea of a defence agreement was not rejected. It 
should not, however, be directly linked to independence.29 
Yet the Ministry of Defence and, especially, the Air Ministry, remained determined to 
secure Britain’s strategic requirements in Nigeria before independence.30 In the run up to the 
constitutional conference with Nigerian representatives of October 1958, the Defence 
Minister emphasised to the Colonial Secretary that it was essential to 
secure by treaty, permanently and without any political escape clauses, 
unrestricted rights (a) to overfly Nigeria; (b) to use Kano Airport as an air-staging 
post for military aircraft; (c) to bring aviation fuel, equipment and other supplies, 
etc., overland from Lagos to Kano; and (d) to use the port facilities at Lagos and 
Port Harcourt in war. 
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In addition, Sandys wanted ‘to retain permanently under British sovereignty a small area or 
areas’ for ‘an airfield or other military facilities’.31 On 11 September, the Cabinet agreed with 
the Defence Minister that the granting of independence should be made conditional on 
securing Britain’s defence interests in Nigeria. Simultaneously, however, it was observed that 
a defence agreement would be ‘more reliable and command greater international respect’ if it 
was signed or ratified by the government of an independent Nigeria.32 
The first Nigerian reaction to the idea of a defence agreement was positive. In late 
September, the Colonial Secretary explained to the Federal Prime Minister of Nigeria that for 
‘the defence of the free world’ Britain wanted to secure overflying rights, as well as air-
staging and naval facilities through a defence agreement. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa from the 
Northern People’s Congress (NPC) not only observed that the Nigerians intended ‘to be full 
members of the Commonwealth doing all our duties’, but also agreed that the defence 
agreement should be discussed during the constitutional conference. Yet during the meeting, 
Alan Lennox-Boyd had not raised the question of enclaves.33 The Colonial Secretary 
remained opposed to enclaves, because he feared that pressing for them would not only 
undermine future relations with Nigeria, but, ultimately, also Britain’s strategic interests in 
West Africa.34 These political considerations were increasingly accepted in the Ministry of 
Defence.35 In mid-October, Sandys agreed with Lennox-Boyd that an enclave was not an 
option. Instead, Britain was supposed to lease land adjacent to Kano airport for the potential 
development of air-staging facilities. Moreover, the outline of the defence agreement for 
discussions with the Nigerians was supposed to be more balanced, and also contain and 
reflect the Nigerian security requirements.36 
On 17 October, the Colonial Secretary met with the Federal Prime Minister and the 
three Regional Premiers of Nigeria to obtain their approval for a defence agreement. While 
he roughly presented the British wish list, he also emphasised that Britain wished to help the 
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Nigerians with their defence requirements after independence. In reaction, the Nigerians 
voiced their unanimous support for the agreement: Abubakar observed that ‘Nigeria wanted 
to remain in the Commonwealth and contribute to its development and defence’; Obafemi 
Awolowo, the Western Premier, stressed that they wanted ‘no agreements with the enemies 
of Britain’, but ‘to be a sister nation within the Commonwealth’; and both Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
the Eastern Premier, and Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Premier, fully endorsed what had been 
said in the meeting.37 It was this agreement in principle, which allowed the Colonial 
Secretary to obtain from his colleagues in the Cabinet meeting of 22 October the 
authorisation to give the Nigerians a firm date for independence in autumn 1960.38 
The British wanted, however, a more binding commitment from the Nigerians. The 
Colonial Secretary thus drafted in cooperation with the Minister of Defence an outline of the 
agreement, which he then submitted to the Nigerian Prime Minister and Regional Premiers on 
24 October. The outline contained provisions for mutual defence, British military assistance 
to Nigeria, reciprocal overflying rights and air-staging facilities, the lease of land to Britain 
for staging purposes, and the use of naval facilities at Lagos and Port Harcourt in time of 
emergency. These provisions, it stated, were to be elaborated into a formal defence 
agreement, which was to be concluded between the two governments on independence. The 
Nigerians endorsed the document without reservations and, on the suggestion of Azikiwe, 
they all initialled the outline. Informed about this diplomatic success, Macmillan 
congratulated Lennox-Boyd for his ‘unflagging zeal’.39 The British had reason to be satisfied, 
for it seemed that they had secured most of their Cold War defence interests in Nigeria for the 
time after independence without any major difficulties. The defence agreement had, however, 
yet to be drafted and agreed between the two parties. Moreover, with independence 





Until the defence agreement would be concluded upon Nigerian independence, it would take 
more than two years, during which the Nigerian position could change. This period did not 
only witness a further escalation of the Cold War and its definitive spread into the Third 
World, but also the rise of the Afro-Asian bloc, non-alignment, and Pan-Africanism. In the 
wake of the Bandung Conference in 1955, the newly independent and emerging nations of 
Asia and Africa increasingly gained a voice in international affairs. Moreover, under the 
leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, Josip Broz Tito, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) took shape and was officially launched at the Belgrade Conference in 
1961. Meanwhile, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, also a founding member of the NAM, 
redoubled his efforts to promote his Pan-Africanist vision. Neutralism and Pan-Africanism 
thus appeared as appealing ideals and policy options that African and Asian nations also tried 
to defend in reaction to the Congo Crisis, which saw the involvement not only of the (former) 
colonial powers, but also of the superpowers. Unsurprisingly, formal defence relationships 
with the former colonial power, especially if it was a leading member of the western bloc, 
were thus increasingly discredited and seen as an obstacle to full independence.40 The 
Nigerian leadership had to take these developments into account, and try to negotiate a 
defence agreement that would be acceptable to the Nigerian opposition and people. 
Meanwhile, British policymakers were aware of the defence agreement’s potential 
unpopularity. In order to retain the goodwill of the Nigerians, and avoid pushing them into 
Soviet arms, they were thus willing to make strategic, financial, and material concessions – 
especially since Nigeria was seen as a source of support for the Western powers in West 
Africa, and Africa more generally.41 
Following the initialling of the outline, the concerned departments in Whitehall began 
with the drafting of the defence agreement which, once ready, would be submitted to the 
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Nigerian ministers.42 British policymakers remained convinced about the strategic value of 
the defence agreement, and were confident that it would establish a firm basis for a close 
security relationship with Nigeria after independence. This also strengthened their belief that 
despite the rise of neutralist sentiments in and Soviet intrusions into Africa, Nigeria would 
remain firmly in the Western camp.43 This positive outlook was strengthened by the largely 
pro-British attitude of the Nigerian elites, especially those from the North. London had 
particularly high hopes and expectations in the Nigerian Prime Minister, a Northerner, who 
adopted a strong anti-communist stance, wanted to cooperate in forestalling Soviet inroads 
into Nigeria, and was outspoken in his desire to maintain strong ties with Britain.44 Abubakar 
believed that a formal defence relationship with Britain was the right way forward. In mid-
August 1959, he announced to the Nigerian House of Representatives that upon 
independence Nigeria would enter into a defence agreement with Britain.45 In light of the 
foreseeable weakness of Nigeria’s armed forces, rising Communist and Soviet influence in 
Ghana, Liberia and Guinea, as well as the disintegration of French West Africa, the Nigerian 
Prime Minister was worried about his country’s security and territorial integrity. In January 
1960, he expressed these fears to the British Prime Minister during the latter’s Africa tour.46 
Macmillan took the Nigerian Prime Minister’s concerns seriously. He was aware that Britain 
mainly intended to cover its own strategic requirements through the defence agreement. But 
he wanted to know from his government what could be done to help maintain Nigeria’s 
integrity after independence.47 The assessment by the Joint Planning Staff and the Chiefs of 
Staff in reaction to this intervention concluded that Nigeria was relatively safe, and that there 
was mainly a localised threat to Nigerian security from Cameroun through the British 
Cameroons. Consequently, from a security perspective, Nigeria only required limited military 
aid.48 In light of Nigeria’s relative strategic importance as a means, rather than an end, it is 
not surprising that British military planners were reluctant to provide military aid. Moreover, 
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the limited financial, manpower, material, and logistical resources were already stretched thin 
between the continental European and global defence commitments, as well as the nuclear 
deterrent, and disputed between the three service departments.49 Nevertheless, from a 
political perspective, British military assistance to Nigeria became increasingly important, 
and thus more substantial. 
Already in August 1959, in commenting on an early draft of the defence agreement, 
the Governor-General of Nigeria observed that it should be more balanced. In order to retain 
Nigerian goodwill, it would have to contain less on Britain’s requirements, and more on 
British military assistance to Nigeria.50 Yet by March 1960 it became clear that the problem 
was more profound. In light of the growing unpopularity of the defence agreement among the 
Nigerian opposition and people, the Governor-General questioned whether the Nigerian 
leaders would remain committed to the defence agreement. He believed that Abubakar and 
the Sardauna, the Northern Premier, ‘would wish to stick to their word’. But he was not sure 
whether Azikiwe and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), and 
Awolowo and the Action Group (AG) were still on board. James Robertson thus stressed that 
the draft defence agreement had to be ‘as simple and uncontroversial as possible, or it may 
easily be made an excuse by the Nigerian Ministers for trying to back out of the whole 
idea’.51 These worries were taken seriously in London,52 without, however, questioning the 
defence agreement. The British intended to capitalise on Abubakar’s fears for Nigerian 
security, and tried to sweeten the pill by emphasising the military and defence assistance 
Nigeria would receive.53 In late March, Macmillan himself wrote to the Nigerian Prime 
Minister on these lines.54 
The draft agreement remained, however, entirely based on the 1958 outline. Rather 
than reducing the benefits that would accrue to Britain from the agreement, the British even 
added a clause on aircraft tropicalisation trials to the draft that was finally sent to Nigerian 
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Ministers for consideration on 31 March.55 Abubakar continued to defend the agreement in 
the Nigerian House of Representatives by emphasising the military assistance that would be 
gained from it to build up the Nigerian Armed Forces. But aware of the agreement’s 
increasing unpopularity, he gave the assurance that his government would not enter into it 
without the House’s approval.56 The main controversial issue of the defence agreement was 
that it allowed Britain to retain and, if desired, establish military bases in Nigeria. The British 
thus foresaw difficulties on this particular point.57 Yet the Nigerian reaction to the draft 
agreement went well beyond the issue of bases. 
In an attempt to rebalance the agreement, the Nigerian Ministers made a number of 
demands for revision. First, and as expected, they were against the lease of land, because it 
would play into the hands of the opposition. Moreover, and probably by playing on British 
fears of Soviet inroads into Africa, they argued that the leasing of land would ‘provide 
opportunities for subversive elements to clamour for financial aid from undesirable quarters’, 
and could thus lead to the overthrow of their government. Second, they were not anymore 
willing to grant unrestricted access to air-staging and port facilities. In times of emergency, 
Britain would have to seek the agreement of the Nigerian government, because it was feared 
that these facilities could be used for an intervention in one of Britain’s remaining African 
dependencies. Third, the results of the aircraft tropicalisation trials should be made available 
to the Nigerian Government. Finally, in order to build up their armed forces, the Nigerians 
asked for substantial provisions on British military assistance.58 In making these demands, the 
Governor-General observed, the Nigerians were adapting to the pressure from the opposition 
and the street. Against the background of South Africa’s racist policies and French atom 
bomb tests in the Sahara, anti-colonial sentiments ran high, and Pan-Africanism and 




Whitehall was alarmed by the Nigerian Ministers’ ‘radical’ demands for revision.60 
Yet in light of the political mood in Nigeria, and in order to retain Nigerian goodwill and help 
protect Abubakar’s government, the Colonial Secretary advised Macmillan ‘to drop the 
request for the lease of land and rely on their good faith for the use of their own airfields’. 
The Prime Minister believed that this was ‘not very satisfactory, but it may be the best we can 
get’.61 Moreover, the concerned departments largely concurred with Macleod. The service 
departments and the Chiefs of Staff were willing to drop the clauses on the lease of land and 
naval facilities. Meanwhile, they were aware that it would be very difficult to get truly 
unrestricted overflying and staging rights, and they would ultimately have to rely on Nigerian 
goodwill. The Chiefs of Staff also recommended ‘that the Agreement should emphasise those 
things which the United Kingdom were providing for Nigeria and not create an impression 
that the Agreement was one-sided’.62 Thus believing that the agreement was in Nigeria’s own 
interest, the Minister of Defence remained confident that Britain should nevertheless ‘be able 
to strike a reasonable bargain’.63 The Chancellor of the Exchequer was already less 
optimistic. Although he did not question the need to compromise, he was against military aid 
to Nigeria ‘when we are getting so little out of the Defence Agreement’.64 Finally, the 
Foreign Secretary emphasised that the Nigerians should not be forced into a defence 
agreement that ‘they considered politically dangerous’, and that ‘might compromise Nigeria’s 
standing amongst independent African states, and hence her ability to exert what we hope 
will be a moderating influence on them’.65 The British were thus willing to make 
concessions. But in exchange of military aid, they still wanted to secure their main strategic 
requirement, i.e. overflying and staging rights.66 
In mid-May 1960, the Colonial Secretary, the Defence Minister, representatives from 
their Ministries and the Commonwealth Relations Office, as well as the Governor-General of 
Nigeria met with the Nigerian Ministers to reach an understanding on the defence agreement. 
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The Regional Premiers, the Federal Prime Minister and his Ministers still believed in the 
advantages of the defence agreement. Especially Abubakar remained convinced that Nigeria 
required military assistance from Britain. This ultimately allowed the British to find a 
compromise with the Nigerians that secured the main strategic requirements. After the British 
had dropped the clauses on leasing land and naval facilities, both delegations concurred that 
the agreement would provide for mutual defence, reciprocal overflying and staging rights, as 
well as British help with the training, equipment and supply of the Nigerian Armed Forces.67 
It was also agreed that the details and exact wording of the agreement would be ironed out 
between Nigerian and British representatives in the coming months.68 
The British service departments and the Treasury were reluctant to make extensive 
and costly commitments on military assistance to Nigeria. But in order to smooth the passage 
of the defence agreement in the Nigerian Parliament, Whitehall was willing to make 
additional concessions.69 During the final negotiations that were held in London in June, the 
Nigerians were able to extract from the British major commitments on military training, 
seconded personnel, and equipment.70 In order to secure the support of Nigerian 
parliamentarians and to retain Nigeria, despite its leaning towards non-alignment,71 firmly in 
the western camp, the British were willing to make additional concessions even thereafter.72 
Fearing that the Nigerians could turn to the Soviet Union, the British agreed to make 
available more financial assistance for the build-up of the Nigerian Armed Forces.73 At the 
expense of its military dimension, the Defence Agreement became increasingly political. It 
was not anymore just about securing Britain’s strategic requirements, but more and more 
about keeping the Nigerians in the western camp. 
The provisions on military assistance were a strong argument in favour of the 
agreement when it was debated in the Nigerian House of Representatives after independence 
on 19 November. The charges from the opposition were led by Awolowo from the AG, who 
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had originally co-initialled the 1958 outline. He mainly argued that the defence agreement 
contained a hidden neo-colonial agenda which would allow for the establishment of British 
bases in Nigeria, and accused the government of being anglophile and pro-western. In 
reaction, the government parties, the NPC and the NCNC, closed their ranks, and the Anglo-
Nigerian Defence Agreement passed with 166 to 39 votes.74 A few days later, it was also 
passed by the Nigerian Senate. Even though the opposition criticised that the agreement 
‘implied a greater entanglement’ with Britain, and ‘unrestricted overflying provided 
espionage facilities’, the discussion was less animated than in the House.75 
Consequently, the British and Nigerian governments had succeeded in bringing the 
defence agreement through. Yet in light of the opposition to the agreement in Nigeria, Britain 
had to make major strategic concessions for political, Cold War-related reasons. In order to 
get the Nigerian political class on board, and avoiding to push the Nigerians away from the 
West into Soviet arms, the British abandoned or reduced some of their strategic requirements, 
and committed themselves to help in the build-up of the Nigerian Armed Forces. 
Consequently, it was Whitehall’s Cold War-driven and increasingly political approach to the 
Defence Agreement that allowed the Nigerians to secure substantial military assistance from 
Britain. It was questionable, however, whether the pro-British government of Abubakar 
would be able to maintain a formal defence relationship with the former imperial power in 
light of continued criticism. 
 
The Primacy of Politics 
The question was whether Britain had achieved a Pyrrhic victory. On the one hand, in 
comparison to the outline of 1958, the defence agreement had lost a lot of its substance. On 
the other hand, the opposition to the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact became increasingly 
vociferous and severe. Paradoxically, for limited strategic gains, the British found themselves 
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in political difficulties. The direct target of the opposition was, however, the Nigerian Prime 
Minister and his government. In addition to the standing of the British, the agreement thus 
also undermined the position of their friend Abubakar, on whom they counted to keep 
Nigeria in the western orbit. Consequently, it was questionable whether the defence 
agreement would be politically sustainable. 
The Nigerian Prime Minister still believed that the defence agreement was in 
Nigeria’s interest, and continued to defend it against the continued charges from the 
opposition, led by the AG.76 The attacks did not, however, remain limited to the Nigerian 
Parliament. In late November 1960, around 800 students descended into the streets of Lagos 
to demonstrate against the agreement. They carried placards that read, among other things, 
‘Away with Anglo-Balewa Pact’, ‘Down with Colonial Mentality’, and ‘Keep us out of 
NATO’. The demonstration turned violent when the students manhandled Nigerian Ministers 
and broke into Cabinet offices and the Houses of Parliament. Eventually, they were allowed 
to present a petition to the Governor-General, according to which the defence agreement ran 
contrary to the foreign policy of non-alignment and thus weakened Nigeria’s international 
role. For the British it was evident that the AG and Awolowo with his ‘inflammatory 
speeches’ were behind the demonstrations. The Nigerian Defence Minister, Muhammadu 
Ribadu, went a step further, and insinuated interference by Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana.77 In 
light of Awolowo’s recent visit to Ghana, this was not unlikely. Moreover, through his strong 
advocacy for non-alignment and a more radical foreign policy, the AG leader attracted the 
discrete support of the Soviet Union.78 
In the wake of the student protests, Abubakar’s Government continued in its attempt 
to explain and justify the defence pact to the Nigerian people. In a broadcast speech, Ribadu 
stressed in particular that Nigeria would not have to go to war if Britain did, there were no 
provisions for British bases, the overflying and staging rights were reciprocal, and there 
22 
 
would be substantial military assistance for the Nigerian Armed Forces.79 In fear of further 
mass demonstrations, the Government also banned all public meetings and processions in 
Lagos for the two weeks prior to the official signing of the defence agreement in early 
January 1961.80 Meanwhile, it prevented the British from holding tropicalisation trials in 
Lagos, which would have given the opposition additional ammunition.81 But despite these 
measures, the situation further escalated. The most militant opposition to the defence pact and 
Abubakar’s pro-western foreign policy came from the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC). 
Founded by former Zikists and led by the Soviet-trained medical practitioner Tunji Otegbeye, 
this organisation rapidly attracted the interest of the Soviet Union. In mid-February 1961, the 
NYC staged a riot in response to the death of Patrice Lumumba and against the defence pact. 
Although the Nigerian Government managed to quell the riot, the defence agreement with 
Britain remained highly contested.82 
The hostility to the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement was inopportune for London. 
British policymakers saw Africa almost exclusively through the prism of the Cold War, 
which was at this time still of a largely ideological, political, and economic nature in Africa, 
at least in West Africa. By spring 1961, they had become particularly worried about the 
eastern bloc’s inroads into Africa and, more specifically, West Africa.83 Rising African 
nationalism, the increasing appeal of non-alignment, and Pan-Africanism seemed to have 
benefited the Soviet Union, but undermined the position of the western powers. In this 
situation, the West had to be ‘careful not to provide evidence for charges against “neo-
colonialism”’, which would further weaken its influence in the region.84 Yet according to the 
Nigerian opposition and other critics in Africa and the East, exactly this evidence was 
provided by the defence pact. The UK High Commissioner to Nigeria, Antony Head, was 
entirely aware of this problem. In early autumn 1961, he observed that the defence agreement 
had a harmful impact on Anglo-Nigerian relations, and thus suggested to examine whether it 
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could be ‘quietly buried’. The agreement, Head argued, was an ‘embarrassment’ for the 
Nigerians, and ‘useless’ for Britain, since the staging facilities could not be used for 
operations against Africans.85 According to Head’s deputy, despite its dislike for the pact, the 
Nigerian Government was ‘determined to stand loyally by it’, especially since it did not want 
to give in to Awolowo. Consequently, the suggestion for abrogation had to come from 
London.86 
The suggestion from the UK High Commissioner initiated a political process, which 
prepared the ground for the abrogation of the defence agreement. The idea of abrogation was 
opposed by the Air Ministry which, because of the overflying and staging rights, was 
particularly concerned. Despite the defence agreement’s limited practical value, it was still 
considered better than nothing. Moreover, changing circumstances could bring about a more 
permissive Nigerian attitude, the strategic usefulness of Kano was not limited to Africa, and 
abrogation would set a precedent that could have a negative impact on other and future 
defence agreements.87 The Air Ministry was relatively lonely with its concerns, and only 
received limited support from the Ministry of Defence, which feared that abrogation would 
create a ‘risky precedent’. The other interested departments increasingly shared Head’s 
concerns that the agreement played into the hands of the Communists by discrediting Britain 
and the Nigerian Government.88 The Commonwealth Relations Office thus put forward the 
idea to free Nigeria of ‘the Imperial Dogcollar’ through a bilateral declaration that the 
agreement had outlived its military usefulness. Meanwhile, the essential strategic 
requirements, such as overflying and staging rights, could be secured through an informal 
exchange of letters.89 Moreover, and even though archival sources do not point into this 
direction, it could have been that the increasing scepticism towards Britain’s ability to 
maintain its role East of Suez indirectly decreased the importance of the Central African air 
route, and thus of Nigeria.90 Finally, the armed forces’ ability to mount expeditionary 
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operations with the help of staging posts and overflying rights was never sufficient to sustain 
Britain’s global role as foreseen by the Sandys White Paper.91 
But policymakers in London had not yet entirely made up their mind, as Abubakar 
informed Head in early December that ‘he would very much like to get rid of’ the defence 
pact. In view of the Lagos Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States of late 
January 1962, he feared that the agreement would be used by the more ‘radical’ Casablanca 
states to attack him and his government.92 The issue had thus reached an unprecedented level 
of urgency.93 Although the Air Ministry reiterated its concerns, it began to accommodate 
itself to the idea of abrogation and that it would have to be satisfied with a less formal 
arrangement to secure its strategic requirements.94 The Foreign Office, by contrast, strongly 
advocated the idea of abrogation and argued that ‘the withdrawal of the Agreement would 
help to improve our “image” in the foreign countries of Africa’. In drawing a comparison 
with France, the Foreign Office also observed that even the French would come under 
increasing pressure for their defence facilities in Africa, and would eventually have to give 
them up.95 Even though this prediction would prove to be wrong, it became increasingly clear 
to policymakers in Whitehall that the strategic reasons against, were outweighed by the 
political reasons in favour of abrogation.96 It also seemed that it would not create a negative 
precedent for Britain’s defence agreement with Malaya.97 Finally, in early January 1962, also 
the Chiefs of Staff accepted that from a political perspective abrogation was inevitable, 
however reluctantly.98 
The die was cast. Minister of Defence Harold Watkinson and Sandys, one of the main 
architects of the defence agreement and who was now Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, agreed that abrogation was desirable. But before committing the British 
Government to abrogation, they wanted from Abubakar a ‘firm assurance’ that ‘in all normal 
circumstances’ they would retain their privileges, in particular overflying and staging rights. 
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In return, Britain would continue to offer Nigeria military assistance.99 The Nigerian Prime 
Minister was absolutely willing to give this assurance. Suddenly, however, he wished to 
postpone the abrogation. Abubakar feared that if the announcement was made so shortly 
before the Lagos Conference, it would be interpreted as ‘window dressing’.100 Sandys was 
willing to comply, but a leakage about the abrogation in Nigeria nevertheless rendered an 
early announcement necessary.101 In all urgency, on 20 January, the UK High Commissioner 
obtained from the Nigerian Prime Minister a written assurance that in exchange for military 
assistance Britain would continue to enjoy overflying and staging rights at Kano ‘in all 
normal circumstances […] in accordance with practice between Commonwealth countries’.102 
Finally, Abubakar and Head also agreed on a joint statement, which was released to the press 
of both countries on 22 January. It stated that in light of the unfounded anxieties surrounding 
the defence agreement, the British and Nigerian Governments had decided to abrogate it. 
Simultaneously, however, they would ‘endeavour to afford to the other at all times such 
assistance and facilities in defence matters as are appropriate between parties in the 
Commonwealth’.103 
The Air Ministry, which had not been kept in the loop and would have wanted first 
the Defence Committee to be consulted, was strongly irritated.104 Yet the British and 
Nigerian Governments had managed to get rid of a thorny issue in Anglo-Nigerian relations, 
which undermined both their positions in Africa. Moreover, Britain retained its overflying 
and staging rights, and Nigeria continued to receive military assistance – at least for the time 
being. Nevertheless, much harm had been done, and the Nigerian opposition rightly alleged 
that the defence agreement had not been truly abrogated, and claimed that ‘there was a secret 





The short-lived Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement was not an imperial, but a Cold War 
design. More importantly, however, it highlights an interesting paradox. Britain’s strategic 
requirements in the global Cold War – whether it was for limited hot wars or a worldwide 
conflagration – and desire to keep Nigeria firmly in the western orbit, created for British 
policymakers the need for a defence agreement. Yet this strategy backfired. In the still largely 
ideological, political, and economic Cold War in Africa, the defence pact came to be seen as 
a neo-colonial tool to tie Nigeria’s destiny to the West. This increasingly undermined the 
hitherto close Anglo-Nigerian relations, as well as British and western influence in West 
Africa. It thus became politically desirable to abrogate the defence agreement. In Britain’s 
post-imperial Cold War grand strategy, political interests conflicted and, ultimately, 
outweighed purely military-strategic interests – at least if they were not deemed absolutely 
essential as in the Nigerian case.106 Moreover, despite abrogation, Britain was able to retain 
limited overflying and staging rights, and the sustainability of its global role was increasingly 
questioned in Whitehall. 
The British benefited during the episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement 
from a cooperative anglophile and pro-western Nigerian leadership. The Federal Prime 
Minister, from the traditionally pro-British Northern Region, his Ministers, and the Regional 
Premiers were all in favour of strong security ties with the former imperial power. They 
believed that the support of Britain was necessary to guarantee the country’s security 
immediately after independence, and to build up the Nigerian Armed Forces. In light of 
Britain’s increasing awareness of the potential unpopularity of the agreement, they were also 
able to extract major strategic, material, and financial concessions from London. But in light 
of the increasing Cold War pressures on Africa, the rise of non-alignment and neutralism, the 
defence pact began to pose a threat to the government of Abubakar and to Nigeria’s 
international standing. The Nigerian Prime Minister thus wanted ‘to get rid of’ it. 
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Nevertheless, in the Cold War world of the early 1960s, he was able to maintain Nigeria’s 
access to British military assistance. 
The British were not only willing to continue to provide military assistance to Nigeria 
in return for overflying and staging rights, but they also feared that the Nigerians could turn 
to other potential ‘benefactors’, notably the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the embryonic 
Nigerian Armed Forces still had to be built up, and as they were modelled on their British 
counterparts, Britain was the obvious source of support. The Anglo-Nigerian defence 
relationship thus survived the abrogation of the agreement.107 It had, however, been 
downgraded to an informal level, and in line with its pretended policy of non-alignment, 
Nigeria increasingly diversified its sources for military assistance. Finally, the controversy 
surrounding the defence pact had considerably weakened the previously special relationship 
between the two countries.108 Anglo-Nigerian relations would never again be so close. 
Consequently, in comparison to the French, the British did not succeed to maintain 
the same level of intimacy with their former colonies and, especially, to establish long-lasting 
defence relationships. The reasons for France’s success are obviously manifold and complex. 
But in general, and if compared to the British experience, it can be argued that the French 
attached much more importance to maintaining their influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
was seen by General de Gaulle and his acolytes as a major pillar of the country’s grandeur. 
Therefore, Paris was willing to do whatever was necessary to retain its pré carré, and thus 
pledged substantial financial and military aid to its former colonies, and made extensive use 
of intelligence, covert operations, and psychological action. Admittedly, the British also 
operated behind the scenes in Africa, as Calder Walton has shown.109 Yet they never attached 
sufficient importance to Sub-Saharan Africa to throw in their already substantially declined 
clout. Simultaneously, and as this article has illustrated, London also faced more complex and 
ambiguous negotiation partners. Although generally in favour of strong defence ties with the 
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British, the Nigerian leadership had to take into account different political and regional 
groups, which in turn were exposed to popular, anti-colonial pressure. The former French 
colonies in West Africa by contrast, with the notable exception of Guinea’s Sékou Touré, 
were led by Francophile and largely authoritarian leaders, who would not let more radical 
anti-colonial elements prevent them from establishing a close and exclusive security 
relationship with Paris.110 France’s continued security role in Francophone Africa, and 
Britain’s military withdrawal from the continent, thus resulted from the policies and actions 
of both the metropoles and the newly independent African states, which had gained 
unprecedented leverage through the globalisation of the Cold War. 
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